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Abstract
Assessing global tendencies and impacts of conditional payments for environmental ser-
vices (PES) programs is challenging because of their heterogeneity, and scarcity of com-
parative studies. This meta-study systematizes 55 PES schemes worldwide in a
quantitative database. Using categorical principal component analysis to highlight cluster-
ing patterns, we reconfirm frequently hypothesized differences between public and private
PES schemes, but also identify diverging patterns between commercial and non-commer-
cial private PES vis-à-vis their service focus, area size, and market orientation. When do
these PES schemes likely achieve significant environmental additionality? Using binary
logistical regression, we find additionality to be positively influenced by three theoretically
recommended PES ‘best design’ features: spatial targeting, payment differentiation, and
strong conditionality, alongside some contextual controls (activity paid for and implementa-
tion time elapsed). Our results thus stress the preeminence of customized design over
operational characteristics when assessing what determines the outcomes of PES
implementation.
Introduction
Payments for environmental services (PES) have become an increasingly popular tool for envi-
ronmental management, supplementing policy tools that were previously widely focused on
command-and-control measures. Dozens of programs to reward provision of environmental
services (ES) are currently being implemented at multiple geographical scales around the world
See e.g. www.watershedconnect.com, www.ecosystemarketplace.com and http://www.oas.org/
dsd/PES/Database.htm#). PES feature direct, conditional contracts to achieve a negotiated
environmental outcome between a provider and a user of environmental services [1]. The
underlying rationale is that if the service user’s gain from pro-environmental action is suffi-
ciently large, there may be a good case for compensating the service-providing landowners for
choosing a profit-wise second-best, but environmentally more benign resource use. This type
of “Coasean deal” implies using a positive economic incentive to enhance a positive (or avoid a
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negative) environmental externality by internalising the costs of conservation [1, 2, 3]. PES the-
ory distinguishes the tool from other positive conservation incentives (e.g. integrated conserva-
tion and development programs, certification) by the notion of direct, conditional ‘quid pro
quo’ payments–i.e. user payments are to be withdrawn when it can be verified that providers
did not comply with their assumed obligations [1, 2]. Conditionality is a core defining charac-
teristic for PES, in the way we are interpreting and delimiting the concept in the following
[4,5].
The popularity of PES also relates to a historical moment of economic and environmental
thought [6]. Much academic interest has been dedicated to disentangling the concept and prin-
ciples of PES [7–11] and how their design features link to socio-environmental impacts [12–
16] and trade-offs [17–19]. Hence, important research questions arise from this literature. For
instance, for which targeted environmental services and scales are user-financed PES schemes
more likely to emerge than government-financed ones? When are the former likely to be more
efficient than the latter, and vice versa? In health, banking, transport and water provision, the
comparative additionality of private vs. public sectors has been debated much more thoroughly
than for environmental services [20–22]. Particularly, so far we widely lack robust quantitative
analysis of global patterns linking targeted ES, geographic location, involved actors, design fea-
tures, and environmental additionality. Understanding such empirical patterns emerging from
the growing body of case studies worldwide could help us gain new insights for policies and
best practices [23].
Notably, private and public sector PES implementation models emerge, co-exist and coop-
erate worldwide. Private PES are usually negotiated and customized to local conditions, includ-
ing so that ES buyers can directly sanction any non-compliance by ES providers [23]. The
Profafor carbon PES in Ecuador [24], the Vittel watershed scheme in France [25] and the
Simanjiro wildlife conservation scheme in Tanzania [26] are such examples of private PES. In
publicly financed PES, local or national governments act to congregate ES user interests by
levying taxes or fees on end users or tax payers -thus remedying for free-rider problems- and
earmarking revenues for conditional payments to ES providers [27]. The Sloping Land Conver-
sion Program in China [28], the Conservation Reserve Program in the USA [29], the PES
national program in Costa Rica [30], and the Payments for Hydrological Services Program in
Mexico [31] are prominent examples. However, public-private PES hybrids with sequential
sector leadership are also found sometimes [32,33]. Here we choose the financing criterion to
distinguish public from private schemes; other studies featured the proximity and influence of
ES users as key criteria of PES categorization [2]. Hence, some municipal local-scale PES (e.g.
watershed schemes) there classified as user-financed in our sample become publicly financed
PES schemes, because a public sector entity acts as collector and custodian of PES funding.
To our knowledge, only three quantitative-comparative PES studies pre-exist. First, [34]
analysed 47 watershed PES schemes worldwide. They confirmed a positive influence of direct-
ness (i.e. absence of intermediaries) on environmental effectiveness, as self-perceived by project
implementers. Second, [35] had 22 broadly classified PES initiatives in Germany and the USA
assessed by 26 socio-environmental experts for their perceived socio-environmental success.
Voluntariness, government participation, and long-term contracts were all found to be associ-
ated with higher frequency of success in their small two-country sample of PES and PES-like
schemes. Third, [36] studied how natural, financial, institutional and socio-economic capital
varied across 23 PES schemes in developing and emergent tropical countries. They found that
PES improved both natural and social capital stocks, and that institutional arrangements fall in
two categories: state-structured and privately financed.
In the present study we aim to strengthen the global-comparative empirical basis of PES
functionality in various respects, by conducting a global-scale meta-analysis. In particular, we
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look at the interplay between PES implementation characteristics, contextual and institutional
factors (including the role of the public and private sectors), and evidence of environmental
additionality. There has been extensive debate whether PES should be broadly defined, or fol-
low a narrower, theoretically-based definition [2,5,8,10]. In the following, we choose a nar-
rower delimitation, focused on conditionality as sine qua non PES criterion [4]. While this
choice evidently caps our sample size, it allows us to look at interventions that are truly compa-
rable. We refer to schemes fitting all five criteria as “canonical PES”, and include in our sample
only schemes that deviate moderately from this ideal setup (see below). We also only include
cases with one or more pre-existing academic assessments in the literature, aiming thus at
assessing only PES schemes with scientifically validated sources of information.
By adopting a globally scoped systematic literature review, including all terrestrial environ-
mental services, we reach a sample of 55 PES schemes. Compared to [34] and [35], we extend
the set of design-oriented (e.g. type of payments, use of baselines, monitoring) and context-spe-
cific variables (e.g. size, region, services transacted, actors involved) in our statistical analysis.
Compared to [36], our twice as large sample enhances the statistical analysis, and treats new
research questions. We thus believe our sample is as broad as the current state of PES affairs
permits, and yet generically similar to be able to compare initiatives.
This article is structured as follows. In Section 2, we describe in detail our sample and meth-
ods. In Section 3 (Results), we follow a sequential approach, going from open-ended explor-
atory methods to an analysis with an assumed causal direction. We start with (a) descriptive
statistics, then turn to (b) a categorical principal component analysis of PES variables, and
lastly (c) analyse econometrically how PES design likely affects environmental additionality.
Finally, we discuss the scope of our findings, and their implications for future research and pol-
icies (Section 4).
Sample and Methods
While hundreds of PES schemes are reported loosely upon in the literature, most contributions
do not provide sufficient in-depth information to be useful for quantitative meta-analysis. We
selected our case studies based on different methodological guidelines for meta-analysis,
derived from clinical and social sciences [37–39]. We carried out a systematic literature
research drawing on various pre-existing PES databases, qualitative PES reviews, journal stor-
age (JSTOR) and other web-based (Google Scholar) sources (Table 1). From the resulting iden-
tified records, we filtered out cases where payments to ES providers (i) could not be confirmed
to have occurred at least once (never mind whether the program was still ongoing); (ii) did not
conform well to our conditionality-focused definition for PES; or (iii) did not in the PES case
study deliver sufficient descriptors to meet our minimum data standards.
This narrowed our sample to 90 literature references referring to a total of 55 PES cases
worldwide (counting until mid-2014 when our statistical analysis was begun), of which 47 are
ongoing (See S1 Table for meta-analysis references and Fig 1 for the PRISMA selection dia-
gram). Fig 2 shows the geographic and thematic focus of the selected PES cases. They feature
payments for the protection and restoration of watersheds (Water) (with 22 cases, the most fre-
quently targeted ES), for biodiversity conservation (Biodiversity) (10 cases), for climate change
mitigation through carbon sequestration or avoided deforestation (Carbon) (8 cases), and for
multiple services from agriculturally dominated systems (Multiple-Agriculture) (12 cases).
Region-wise, countries with emerging economies dominate, especially Latin America with 23
cases. Industrialised countries have less PES cases, though some are huge government schemes
that outsize small-scale initiatives by orders of magnitude. We did not weight our observation
in terms of scheme size, but treated each case equally. Hence, our analysis comes to put
PESGlobal Patterns
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relatively more emphasis on a series of smaller-scale PES schemes that predominate in non-
OECD countries.
We built a database of in total 50 basic variables, a dozen of which we employ analytically.
The main categories are:
1. implementation modes (broad PES scheme descriptors, land-ES link, spatial extent);
2. program design (monitoring, sanctioning, baselines, ES targeting, differentiation of
payments);
3. program institutional arrangements (ES buyer and provider types, source of payments, pres-
ence of intermediaries, transaction setting);
4. program funding (degree of user-financing, length of the contract, type and level of
payment);
5. scheme adherence to our PES “canonical” standards (indexed degree of fit with PES theory);
and
Table 1. Database search protocol for PES studies included in study sample.
Database Search strategy Search terms Total
references
(after
duplicates)
Filtering conditions Total meta-
analysis
references
Science direct Databases: All
sourcesSubjects included: All
search termsSearched in: Title,
abstracts and keywordsDates:
2000–2014
Payments for ecosystem
services, OR payments for
environmental services OR,
singly or linked to the
following: *additionality,
*ecosystem services,
*assessment, *public sector,
*private sector, *biodiversity,
*watershed services, *Asia,
*Europe, *USA, *Latin
America, *South America,*
[Country name]
276 (157) Selected studies contain: (i) a
scheme that respects
conditionality deﬁnition; AND
(ii) has at least made one
cycle of payments; AND (iii)
offers detailed PES
implementation of case study
description AND (ii)
quantitative OR qualitative
scientiﬁc evidence on the
scheme environmental
additionality
33
Scopus Databases (content sources):
All sourcesDocument type: All
search termsSearched in:
Article title, abstract, keywords.
Dates: 2000–2014
493 (338) 48
German national
library https://portal.
dnb.de
Search in: Online
CatalogueSearch: All search
terms
16 (15) 1
Open Greyhttp://
www.opengrey.eu/
Search: All search terms 10 (10) 1
HighWirehttp://
highwire.stanford.
edu
Search Title and Abstract
only: All search
termsDatabases: HighWire-
hostedDates: 2000 –Present
24 (20) 3
British national
libraryhttp://www.
bldss.bl.uk
Search: All search terms 250 (25) 1
Google Scholar Search: All search terms 500* (3) 3
Brazilian scientiﬁc
electronic library
onlinehttp://www.
scielo.br/
Search: All search termsIn
ﬁeld: All indexes
2 (2) 0
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0149847.t001
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Fig 1. PRISMA flowchart for the identification and selection of PES schemes included in the study.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0149847.g001
Fig 2. Location of PES schemes analysed.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0149847.g002
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6. evidence of environmental additionality (unit measured, method, level).
Generally, we combined categorical (no hierarchy between levels), ordinal (hierarchical
between levels), and continuous variables (cardinal ranking) in our analysis. S1 Database
describes all variables in detail, but a few points are worth flagging. We registered which actors
participated in different implementation stages, and classified them between public, private
commercial (enterprises) and private non-commercial (NGOs, foundations, grassroots organi-
zations) sectors (iii). Under funding sources (iv), we describe which sectors assumed which
payments (cash and in-kind). Costs were divided into upfront (e.g. information, design, capac-
ity building and negotiation costs) versus recurrent management costs (e.g. administrative,
implementation, monitoring costs), and payments proper. Schemes totally or mainly funded
by the public sector were classified as public-sector schemes; correspondingly for the two other
sectors.
Fitness to a “canonical PES” (v) is a composite indicator derived from the sum of the criteria
that refer to the compliance or not with the five PES definitional criteria mentioned above, plus
the degree of transfer directness (adapted from [8]). This composite indicator allows us to cap-
ture the degree of implementation closeness to PES theory, using an ordinal indicator with
scores ranging from 6 to 17 (S2 Table). The variable “economic setting” differentiates between
degrees of competition on both provider and user sides (e.g. monopsony, oligopsony, club,
market) [35]. Descriptive statistics of the main variables are shown in Table 2.
Finally, environmental additionality (vi) was clearly the most challenging variable, but also
of great interest [40]. One previous meta-analysis used expert scores [35], another implementer
self-assessment [34] of the degree of environmental success. Potentially we could have focused
exclusively on studies using so-called rigorous impact assessment methods. Due to the scarcity
of those so far in assessing PES [41], a recent systematic PES literature review applying that
Table 2. Descriptive statistics for our main variables.
Variable Type Unit Mean SD Median Min. Max. Levels
PES objective Cat - 2,18 1,19 2.0 1 4 1 = Watershed protection; 2 = Biodiversity protection;
3 = Climate change mitigation; 4 = Multiple
Ecosyst. type Cat - 1,65 0,7 2.0 1 3 1 = Forest; 2 = Farmland; 3 = Semi-arid grasslands
Log10 size Quant Log10(ha) 3.99 1.72 3.9 0.90 7.20
Sector Cat - 2.29 0.87 3.0 1 3 1 = Private; 2 = Non-proﬁt; 3 = Government
Transaction costs Cat - 1.44 0.69 1.0 1 3 1 = Public; 2 = Non-proﬁ;t 3 = Private
Running costs Cat - 1.65 0.82 1.0 1 3 1 = Public; 2 = Non-proﬁt; 3 = Private
Payment costs Cat - 1.73 0.89 1.0 1 3 1 = Public; 2 = Non-proﬁt; 3 = Private
Market setting Cat - 1.75 0.98 1.0 1 3 1 = Monopsone; 2 = Oligopsone; 3 = Club; 4 = Market
Payers are users Ord - 1.53 0.50 2.0 1 2 1 = No; 2 = Yes
Conditionality
(Monitoring*Sanction)
Ord - 3.96 2.41 3.0 1 9
Fitness to Coasean
deﬁnition
Ord - 12.22 2.24 12,0 8 17
Log10 payment per ha Quant Log10
(USD/ha)
1.72 1.01 1.9 -0.68 3.58
Additionality Ord - 0.76 0,43 1.0 0 1 0 = No signiﬁcant; 1 = Signiﬁcant
Activity paid Cat. - 0.60 0.49 1.0 0 1 0 = Conservation;1 = Asset-building PES
Diversiﬁcation of payments Cat. - 0.65 0.48 1.0 0 1 0 = No; 1 = Yes
Spatial targeting Cat. - 1.05 0.65 1.0 0 2 0 = No targeting; 1 = Threat or ES density; 2 = Both
Additionality precision Ord. - 3.00 1.37 3,0 1 5 1 = Weak; 2 = Fragile; 3 = Medium; 4 = Strong;
5 = Rigurous
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0149847.t002
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filter ended up with just 11 studies, six of which alone on Costa Rica’s PSA program [42]. Para-
doxically, even among those six “rigorous” studies on Costa Rica, non-trivial differences exist
in their bottom-line additionality, including because of variability in the methods used (e.g.
matching techniques and controlling for sources of impact heterogeneity).
Even when researchers have not yet produced the perfect data sets for quantitative impact
evaluation, practitioners and policy makers still need to make real-world choices about how to
design their interventions, taking stock of the current state of affairs in the best possible way. In
this study, we have thus opted for including both quantitative and qualitative documentation
on environmental additionality, and classified it according to the precision of the assessment
methods, resulting in five levels (S3 and S4 Tables). Consequently, we opted for the least pre-
tentious outcome assessment: a binary variable to differentiate between, on the one hand, likely
zero or low and on the other, likely considerable additionality in ES delivery and/or a targeted
land-use proxy, such as forest cover. In addition, we performed various sensitivity analyses on
our additionality assessments. From the total of 55 PES cases, for four simply no attempt had
been made to gauge environmental additionality, thus restraining the number of cases for the
additionality analysis to 51.
Results
Descriptive statistics
Our first interest is whether, as hypothesized in the PES literature, substantial differences
exist between the characteristics of public vs. privately funded PES schemes [2,17]. Geo-
graphically, sector funding exhibits three patterns: In Latin America, about one tenth of cases
are private non-commercial initiatives (9%), one fourth is private commercial, while two
thirds (65%) are publicly funded cases. Europe, North America and Asia present a slightly
higher frequency of publicly funded PES (70%). In Africa, privately funded schemes clearly
predominate (85%). Half of these private schemes are run by the private commercial sector,
especially for eco-tourism and wildlife. Do sectors alternate their lead of PES schemes over
time? For one fourth of our cases, this is the case. The sector initiating the PES scheme (carry-
ing upfront costs) also continues covering the recurrent management costs in 73% of cases.
Where shifts occur, most frequently the public sector covers the initial costs, transferring the
project afterwards to the private commercial sector to manage it. For instance, the Scolel Té
project in Southern Mexico had initial funding from the UK Department for International
Development (DFID) in partnership with the Mexican university El Colegio de la Frontera
Sur (Ecosur) and the University of Edinburgh to kick-start this forest carbon scheme, while
currently it is managed by the private company Ambio [43]. Such sequential transfer of lead-
ership between private and public environment sectors has also been observed in other sec-
tors [22].
How do per-hectare payments vary across the sample? Our oldest PES scheme, the Conser-
vation Reserve Program (USA), started in 1985. Hence, we adjusted payments for inflation,
converting to real US$ from 2003 –the median starting year of assessed PES cases (Source:
http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/statistics). Mean payments and size of PES schemes are both sig-
nificantly different across ES targeted (ANOVA F = 9.5 p = 0.00 for payments, ANOVA
F = 3.6 p = 0.02, for area). Watershed PES schemes are the smallest in size (Fig 3A), but record
the highest annual per-hectare payments (3B), compared to other ES. Carbon, biodiversity and
multi-functional agriculture PES schemes score similar in size, although carbon PES show
large variability. Multifunctional agricultural PES schemes vary the least in payment amounts,
and account for large areas. The lowest payments are for biodiversity PES, but with large vari-
ance. Unsurprisingly, public schemes are on average larger in size than private ones, especially
PESGlobal Patterns
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vis-à-vis non-commercials, but also pay more per hectare (3C, 3D). As expected, payments
vary much less in public than in private schemes (see S5 Table for details)
Variable patterns and clusters
PES schemes typically exhibit differences across services and implementing sectors (public vs.
private), but do characteristics cluster in more systematic ways, as hypothesized in the PES lit-
erature [4,20]? In this subsection, we use multi-dimensional categorical principal component
(CatPCA) and cluster analyses to explore underlying patterns. The analyses were conducted in
a matrix of 55 PES (cases) and eight relevant categorical variables (attributes), including those
synthetizing PES categories as defined by [35], and the composite index describing the “canoni-
cal PES” fitness. CatPCA reduces the multidimensional space represented by this matrix into a
given number (usually two or three) of orthogonal (independent) dimensions. Each dimension
is defined through a combination of the variables, and represents in decreasing order a given
percentage of the total variability in the matrix. The data in the matrix have a strong internal
consistency and reliability (Cronbach's Alpha = 0.87 –S6 Table). Fig 4 shows the first two
dimensions of the analysis, representing a 52.1% of the total variability of our 55 cases per 8
variables matrix.
We additionally performed a cluster analysis (distance measure: Sorensen; group linkage
method: group average) resulting in three distinct groupings of cases and attributes. The drawn
border lines in Fig 4 delimit the PES schemes belonging to each of the three clusters. The com-
bined CatPCA and cluster show which schemes have closest coordinates, and thus are more
similar, the degree of concentration of PES schemes within groups, and the distance between
groups. Variables with extreme values in one or both of the two axes define the cluster charac-
teristics, since each axis is a vector composed by the weights of all the variables. On the con-
trary, variables close to the origin of the quadrant lines are variables that are present in two or
more groups, and therefore do not explain the differences between groups. We identify the fol-
lowing three groupings:
Fig 3. Box plot showing the distribution—median, interquartile range (box), upper and lower values
below 1.5 interquartile range and outliers, of total cash payments and PES area size in a logarithmic
(base 10) scale by ES targeted (sub-Figs A and B) and economic sector (C and D). In parenthesis are
number of observation for each category.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0149847.g003
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• Group 1 (G1) has typical “agri-environmental public PES” characteristics, being defined by
the association of: farmland ecosystems, multi-functional agricultural ES, public sector carry-
ing upfront, management and payment costs, monopsony setting, low-to-medium scores for
the fitness to a “canonical PES”, source of payments is not ES users;
• Group 2 (G2) could be called “NGO-led biodiversity PES”, as it is defined by the association
of: semi-arid ecosystems, biodiversity as main ES target, non-profit sector carrying upfront,
management and payment costs, oligopsony economic setting, high score for the fitness to a
“canonical PES”;
• Group 3 (G3) we labeled “Private commercial carbon and water PES”, being defined by the
association of: PES schemes targeting carbon-related ES, private sector carrying upfront,
management and payment costs, high to very-high scores with regard to canonical PES
index, source of payments is ES users.
While the PES literature previously had recognized important differences between public
and private PES schemes [9,17], our analysis here thus also points to important differences
within the private group between commercial and NGO-led PES schemes, e.g. with respect to
ES focus and financing sources: a threefold sectoral categorization is thus empirically more jus-
tified. Conversely, it is also interesting to observe that forest ecosystems are placed very close to
Fig 4. Categorical principal component analysis of main PES design types (see also S2 Table). Triangles refer to public PES, circles to private. G1, G2,
G3 refer to PES schemes belonging to cluster groupings 1, 2, and 3, respectively.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0149847.g004
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the intersection of both axis, suggesting that conserving forested ecosystems through PES is
being approached from a combination of agri-environmental, carbon and biodiversity
schemes.
c) PES design and the degree of additionality
In almost any PES literature review, a key reader question will be “what schemes worked?”,
i.e. which combination of ES objectives, contextual preconditions, and design elements has led
to successful outcomes? As explained above, in answering this question we are handicapped by
an extreme scarcity of rigorous PES impact evaluations, and by a sample size that moderately
limits our degrees of freedom in statistical analysis. In response, we attempt in this section to
answer econometrically a more limited sub-question: What key PES design factors may predict
whether a PES scheme achieves at least some environmental additionality? An emerging litera-
ture on the principles of environmentally effective PES design points to particularly three criti-
cal factors of high potential [44–48]:
1. Spatial targeting of contracts—vis-à-vis hot-spots of high ES intensity, and high threat
(leverage of change), respectively: by using pre-identified spatial filters to give explicitly
higher focus to areas of potentially high ES gains (e.g. biodiversity hotspots) and high lever-
age (e.g. current deforestation hotspots), the chances for making a measurable environmen-
tal difference increase;
2. Differentiated payments—vis-à-vis variable provision costs across ES providers: whenever
ES providers are heterogeneous in their profit opportunities (due to different asset holdings
and technologies, market access, preferences, etc.), then offering them different payments
levels (or even variable contract types) leads to greater cost efficiency than paying everybody
the same (per hectare, family), thus potentially stretching the scheme’s environmental gains;
3. Conditionality degree—the implementer’s combined efforts to monitor and sanction incom-
pliance: PES schemes that are perceived by ES providers to be ill-monitored and –enforced
will often eventually lead to widespread non-compliance, as cashing in on PES while follow-
ing ‘business as usual’ becomes a profitable cheating strategy. The hypothesis here is that
PES schemes which go serious about implementing this quintessential PES feature will also
tend to perform better with respect to their environmental outcomes.
For spatial targeting (i), we distinguished three progressive levels: a) no targeting, b) either
ES density or threat targeted; c) both density and threat targeted. Differentiated payments (ii)
were classified binarily, according to whether or not more than one single payment level (pre-
dominantly per-hectare, but also per-household payments) was used. Conditionality (iii) we
constructed as the product of indices for documented monitoring and sanctioning efforts,
respectively.
In addition, we included three control variables in the estimation. First, the public vs. private
commercial and non-commercial funding distinction proved its importance in the preceding
analysis. Second, baselines and additionality assessments tend to differ substantially whether
PES are “asset-building” (i.e. paying for added environmental value, such as tree planting) or
“activity-restricting”, (i.e. made for avoiding projected damage, such as reducing deforestation)
[40]. Finally, the time elapsed since project start could also be stage-setting, e.g. in terms of
learning-by-doing effects on environmental effectiveness being allowed to kick in as the imple-
mentation process proceeds.
Table 3 shows the result of the binary logistical regression testing the predictive level of the
above described critical design variables on environmental additionality for the 51 cases for
which it was possible to obtain an estimation of additionality. Overall, the model has a robust
fit (Cox & Snell R2 = 0.52; Nagelkerke R2 = 0.79) correctly predicting 97% of additionality and
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83% of no additionality cases (overall predictive accuracy of 94%); the Hosmer-Lemeshow test
to assess the null hypothesis that the model prediction does not fit perfectly with the observed
data was not significant (H-L p = 0.55), confirming the goodness of fit of the model. Multicolli-
nearity checks are also robust indicating no collinearity among the variables included in the
model (Tolerance>0.2; VIF<3; S7 and S8 Tables; VIF: Variance Inflation Factor).
Starting with the control variables (a) in Model I, we see that it makes the expected differ-
ence for assessed additionality whether the PES scheme is asset-building versus preventively
conserving nature by avoiding projected pressures. This expresses probably that it is much eas-
ier to verify the achievement of an additional outcome when an asset has been added (e.g.
planting a tree) than when a projected damage has been avoided (e.g. leaving a threatened tree
standing) (dummy significant at 5% level). Interestingly, the two sectoral control variables do
not come out as significant, in spite of having been flagged as important determinants of clus-
ters in the above. We attribute this to the inclusion of design variables: much of what we see as
sector differences may hide different PES design principles. Finally, the implementation time
variable is significant (5% level), but with an unexpected negative sign, indicating that older
schemes tend to be less additional than more recent ones. Since most of the schemes are still
ongoing, implementation time thus widely comes to reflect the calendar year when the scheme
was implemented. While there is thus little evidence of learning-by-doing impacts within each
PES scheme, implementers may indeed learn more from each other (e.g. through various PES
Table 3. Binary logistic regression model predicting the degree of PES environmental additionality.
Model I Model II
Variable Coefﬁcient Standard error Coefﬁcient Standard error
Activity paid 5.25** 2.41 5.83* 3.45
(Dummy: 0 = Conservation; 1 = Asset building)
Payments diversiﬁcation (level = 0) 5.11** 2.50 4.64* 2.83
(Dummy: 0 = No; 1 = Yes)
Spatial targeting 6.74* 3.58 9.31* 5.58
(Ordinal: 2 = Threat and ES density)
Conditionality 1.56** 0.80 1.45* 0.85
(Ordinal: Monitoring*Sanction)
Sector ﬁnanced
(Nominal: 1 = Private proﬁt; 2 = Private non-proﬁt)
Level = Private proﬁt 6.92 22.30 9.29 72.33
Level = Private non-proﬁt -3.82 3.25 -6.99 5.50
Time (years since PES scheme) -0.40** 0.18 -0.53* 0.30
Additionality assessment precision 1.30 1.04
(Ordinal: 1 = very weak; 5 = very strong)
Constant -10.54* 5.82 -13.28* 7.41
N = 51
-2 Log likelihood = 18.00 14.78
Cox & Snell R2 0.52 0.55
Nagelkerke R2 0.79 0.83
Correct predictions 94.1% 96.1
H-L test p 0.55 1
*/**Statistical signiﬁcance at 10% and 5%.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0149847.t003
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networks), so that newer PES schemes are able to avoid some features that have not worked
well for other implementers in the past, in terms of reaching their environmental objectives.
Turning now to the three PES design variables, they were all estimated with the expected
positive sign (i.e. increasing additionality), though with slightly different levels of significance:
payment diversification and the degree of conditionality had a strong effect (significant at 5%
level), while spatial targeting narrowly misses that threshold (significant at 10% level). This is
an important finding, which reconfirms the recommendations for implementation that are
being put forward in the more theoretically orientated PES literature.
Our results could potentially have been affected by the precision level of the environmental
additionality estimations. To control for the sensitivity of the model to this factor, we run the
previous model including the created ordinal variable describing the precision of additionality
measures (Model II in Table 3). The resulting model is robust (Cox & Snell R2 = 0.55; Nagelk-
erke R2 = 0.83; overall predictive accuracy of 96%; no multicollinearity) and confirms the pre-
dictive significance of the three critical design factors: Diversification of payments, spatial
targeting and conditionality.
Discussion and Conclusion
Meta-analyses can help us recognizing global empirical patterns of PES. As the PES literature
flourishes and new case studies are continuously being added, we have the opportunity to gain
more knowledge about commonalities in implementation and outcomes. In this article, we
took advantage of the expansion of PES case studies in recent years to construct a global data-
base. We used a fairly narrow and explicit definition of PES, in order to identify comparable
schemes. The cases selected show a balanced number of schemes by geographical region, eco-
system type, ecosystem service and economic sector involved, showing that the systematic
review procedure succeeded in limiting the risk of selection bias. For instance, the limited num-
ber of African PES schemes included in our study reflects the actual slower up-take of PES in
this continent. We included quantitative and qualitative data from what we see functionally as
“genuine” PES schemes, using a narrow PES definition that ensures comparability. We also fil-
tered out cases without the availability of sufficient reliable documentation. We then conducted
some exploratory analysis of the emerging patterns of implementation, going from purely
descriptive bivariate statistics to principal component analysis of emerging variable clusters,
and finally to test some theoretically sustained hypotheses regarding the association of alleged
key PES design variables with positive environmental additionality.
From our descriptive analysis, we noted significant differences between publicly and pri-
vately financed PES schemes (e.g. public schemes feature larger in area and more costly
schemes), but also between the different ES that these schemes target. Public sector PES partici-
pation is high in Europe and Asia (with a tradition for public-sector environmental manage-
ment), yet very low in Sub-Saharan Africa, where public sector institutions have lower capacity
to organize PES schemes. Latin America, the prime region of PES implementation, displays a
large variety of arrangements.
Next, we identified through categorical principal component analysis three dominating
clusters, which we label “agri-environmental public PES”, “NGO-led biodiversity PES”, and
“private commercial carbon PES”. Each of these interacts with a set of variables (ecosystem,
target ES, lead actors, etc.). While we thus reconfirm the hypothesis from the pre-existing PES
literature that public and private PES differ significantly, our results also point to important
differences between the two types of private PES schemes: the typical commercial PES (private
for-profit company) and the non-commercial (non-governmental not-for-profit organiza-
tions) exhibit distinct patterns. Still, also some permeability between the three groups remains,
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showing that PES implementation is also the result of a hybridization and cooperation between
public and private sectors.
Finally, we also attempted to scrutinize which PES design factors influenced environmental
outcomes, as measured by a binarily defined proxy of environmental additionality. We con-
firmed the significance of spatial targeting (for ES density and threat) and, to a statistically
somewhat lesser extent, of payment differentiation (as opposed to uniform payments) and the
degree of conditionality (monitoring and sanctioning efforts applied). Payments for building
environmental assets were also more likely to be additional than payments for avoiding dam-
ages. Interestingly, the public vs. private sector distinction, applied here as a control variable,
no longer came out as significant. This could imply that the main differences in outcomes
between public and private PES manifest themselves through divergences in technical PES
design principles, rather than being sui generis differences. Our additionality findings are
robust to the sensitivity analysis with respect to the precision in measuring environmental
additionality: stronger precision does not condition the validity of the model, and the key
design variables remain significant.
As so often in complex interactions between social and biophysical systems, could there
potentially be problems of endogeneity in the relations we tested for in our binary logistical
regression analysis? For instance, additionality targets may certainly from the outset be lower
in public PES schemes, which tend to have more side-objectives. However, this should be con-
trolled for by our sector variables. In principle, we believe that environmental additionality as a
response variable constitutes a true ‘bottom line’ of the interplay between PES contexts and the
design of PES interventions. We are thus confident that endogeneity does not constitute a
major problem, if any. Yet, as a precautionary measure and sensitivity check, we also ran the
model at three different probability cut-off levels (0.25, 0.50 and 0.75), in order to capture the
influence of the ex-ante probability of the environmental additionality in the model. We find
no changes in model descriptors although the highest accuracy is obtained with the equal-
probability assumption of 0.50 (S9 Table). This reinforces our conviction that our current
model specification is robust.
For future research, we believe our global-comparative analysis could eventually be
improved by including more cases, as they become available, and by more consolidated infor-
mation about rigorously evaluated key PES outcomes, in both environmental and socioeco-
nomic terms. However, the current scarcity of rigorous impact evaluations applies not only to
PES, but basically to any conservation tool other than protected areas [32,41]. While our addi-
tionality measure and some of the design proxies are admittedly still rough approximations,
our results can be seen as a first set of pointers, to be tested subsequently in more sophisticated
ways with more and better data.
Nevertheless, our analyses give an interesting indication that, after controlling for various
contextual factors, the application of the best PES design principles may add value to the envi-
ronmental outcomes. This represents a call for greater efforts of using state-of-the-art princi-
ples to make PES design more sophisticated, e.g. in terms of monitoring, targeting and
differentiation. As a recommendation, this will probably not be favored across the board by all
PES implementers. Yet, to put it conversely, our results indicate that there may be ample effi-
ciency costs attached to the over-simplification of policies and interventions in environmental
incentive programs such as PES.
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